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Using 1994-98 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) microdata, this paper 
investigates the impact of employment protection laws on the incidence of temporary 
employment by demographic group.  More stringent employment protection for regular jobs is 
predicted to increase the relative incidence of nonemployment and temporary employment 
among employees for less experienced and less skilled individuals.  I test this reasoning using 
IALS data for Canada, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, countries with widely differing levels of mandated employment protection (EPL).   
Multinomial logit analyses (with nonemployment, temporary employment and permanent 
employment as the possible outcomes) find that the strength of such mandates (as measured by 
the OECD) is positively associated with the relative incidence of joblessness for younger 
individuals, women and immigrants, controlling for demographic factors and country-specific 
effects affecting nonemployment, and temporary and permanent employment.  Moreover, among 
wage and salary workers, EPL is positively associated with the relative incidence of temporary 
employment for young workers, native women, immigrant women and those with low cognitive 
ability.  I subject these findings on the incidence of temporary employment among employees to 
a variety of robustness checks.  For example, the effects largely hold up when I adjust for the 
possible sample selection due to the fact that employment to population ratios differ across 
countries, when I disaggregate the effects of the OECD employment protection index into its 
component parts, when I exclude countries with the highest or lowest levels of employment 
protection mandates, and when I exclude those of school attendance age (16-25 years old).  And, 
the effects of protection on the relative incidence of nonemployment for young and less skilled 
individuals, as well as the incidence of temporary employment among young, female, and 
immigrant employees are stronger in countries with higher levels of collective bargaining 
coverage.  These patterns suggest a connection between binding wage floors and the allocative 
effects of employment protection mandates. 
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 I.  Introduction 
 
   
A considerable volume of economic research has been devoted over the last two decades 
to explaining and suggesting remedies for the stubbornly high unemployment rates in a number 
of European countries.  Many authors have focused on labor market and other institutions as an 
important factor playing a role in influencing unemployment.
1  These institutions include 
collective bargaining, employment protection mandates, restrictions on business entry, and 
mandated benefit programs such as unemployment insurance (UI) and disability programs, as 
well as the taxes levied to pay for them.  Temporary employment contracts without mandated 
protection (or considerably less protection than exists on permanent jobs) have been used in a 
number of countries as an attempt to generate jobs that would not have been created and, 
therefore, as a policy designed to lower unemployment.  It is sometimes argued that by allowing 
firms to create jobs with a fixed duration and with little or no termination costs, policies 
authorizing fixed term contracts increase the flexibility of labor markets made rigid by the 
institutions just mentioned.
2  On the other hand, such policies may encourage firms to substitute 
temporary for permanent jobs thereby increasing the overall exit rate from jobs; the resulting 
higher turnover may even lead to higher unemployment than before, despite the new jobs created 
(Blanchard and Landier 2002).   
While the ability of temporary contracts to lower the overall unemployment rate is 
uncertain, most analysts are agreed that more extensive employment protection mandates for 
permanent jobs increase incentives for firms to offer temporary jobs, and empirical research has 
found support for this prediction.
3  This outcome is important since temporary jobs tend to be 
                                                           
1  See Nickell and Layard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), and Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005). 
2  A notable example is Spain, which in the 1980s and 1990s had extremely high unemployment rates and 
liberalized the use of temporary contracts in an attempt to generate jobs.  See Dolado, Garcia-Serrano and Jimeno 
(2002). 
3  See, for example, Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), and Güell (2003) for theoretical 
models with this prediction.  On the other hand, Lazear (1990) suggests that if wages are flexible, then to the extent 
that firing costs take the form of severance payments to workers, they need not raise the overall cost of offering 
permanent jobs.  Instead, when there are high mandated firing costs, wages will adjust downward.  Of course, if 
 lower paying, and offer less training, other things equal, than permanent jobs; moreover, workers 
in temporary jobs express lower levels of job satisfaction than comparable workers in permanent 
jobs (Booth, Francesconi and Frank 2002).  Thus, policies that lead to a substitution of 
temporary jobs for permanent jobs may actually worsen the welfare of the average worker, 
especially in the event that this policy doesn’t lead to lower unemployment (Blanchard and 
Landier 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002).   
The reasoning in such theoretical models suggests that the incidence of temporary jobs 
will not be randomly distributed across the labor force.  Specifically, when there are substantial 
firing costs for permanent jobs, firms will be relatively reluctant to hire new entrants into such 
jobs.  Instead, new entrants will be placed in temporary jobs where their productivity can be 
assessed before a permanent offer is made.  New entrants disproportionately include the young, 
women and, possibly, immigrants.   
This paper studies the impact of employment protection mandates on demographic 
patterns of temporary employment as well as nonemployment.  As I show below, an extension of 
these theoretical models implies that higher firing costs for permanent jobs tend to widen the gap 
between the incidence of permanent jobs for experienced workers vs. recent entrants, as well as 
the gap in overall employment between these groups of workers.  Moreover, suppose that wage 
floors constrain firms’ ability to compensate for firing costs by offering lower wages.  Then low 
wage workers such as the young, women, immigrants, and those with low cognitive skills will 
also be less likely to be able to obtain permanent jobs.  These effects will again be larger the 
more expensive it is to fire someone from a permanent job.  Further, to the extent that exits are 
more frequent from temporary than from permanent jobs, firing costs also are expected to raise 
the relative incidence of joblessness of less experienced and less skilled workers.  To test this 
reasoning, I use the 1994-98 International Adult Literacy Surveys (IALS) microdata files, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
there are also mandated wage floors, or if employment protection regulation takes the form of wasteful procedures 
not resulting in payments to discharged workers, then wages are not likely to adjust downward to fully compensate 
firms for firing costs.  Thus, the impact of firing costs for permanent jobs on the incidence of temporary jobs is to 
some degree an empirical question, and Booth, Dolado and Frank (2002) obtain aggregate evidence suggesting that 
employment protection does indeed raise the incidence of temporary employment.   
  2contain information on whether one was employed in a temporary or a permanent job and a 
variety of demographic information.  In addition, the IALS contains cognitive skills data on 
these individuals from common tests, allowing one to make comparisons across countries in the 
effect of employment protection by skill level.
4  The countries for which the IALS contains data 
allowing me to analyze these effects include Canada, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  As I discuss further below, these 
countries differ widely in the extent to which they have enacted employment protection 
mandates, providing a high degree of variability in this key explanatory variable.   
I find that across these countries, all else equal, the strength of employment protection 
mandates (EPL-as measured by the OECD) is positively associated with the relative incidence of 
joblessness among the young, immigrants, and women, controlling for demographic factors and 
country dummy variables.  The EPL effects on the nonemployment of the young are stronger in 
countries with higher levels of collective bargaining coverage, and EPL has a negative 
interaction effect with collective bargaining coverage on the relative employment of the less 
skilled, as measured by both years of schooling and cognitive test scores.  Moreover, I find that 
among wage and salary workers, stronger EPL raises the relative incidence of temporary 
employment for young workers, native women, and especially immigrant women, as predicted.  
And there is some evidence that protection has a disproportionate effect raising the incidence of 
temporary employment for those employed workers with low cognitive ability, an expected 
outcome to the extent that wage floors prevent pay from adjusting in response to mandated 
employment protection.   
These results for the incidence of temporary employment among employed workers were 
subjected to a variety of robustness checks.  For example, the basic results largely hold up when 
I adjust for the possible sample selection bias induced by the fact that employment to population 
ratios differ across countries.  They also continue to hold when I disaggregate the OECD’s 
employment protection index into its component parts:  duration of mandated severance 
                                                           
4  The IALS data are described in more detail below. 
  3payments; mandated compensation for unfair dismissal; length of mandatory notice in the event 
of layoffs; and an index of procedural inconvenience facing employers who wish to dismiss 
workers.  The results also are robust to the exclusion of individual countries with the highest 
(Italy or the Netherlands) or the lowest levels of mandated employment protection (the United 
States) and when I exclude those of school attendance age (16-25 years old).  And I further find 
that collective bargaining coverage has significantly negative interaction effects with 
employment protection on the relative incidence of permanent jobs for the young, immigrants, 
and women, as predicted by the wage floor reasoning mentioned above.  These results provide 
evidence that labor market institutions disproportionately protect the jobs of prime age males, 
effects that are complementary to existing research which finds that the young and women are 
disproportionately disemployed or unemployed in heavily unionized societies, all else equal 
(Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002). 
 
II.  Employment Protection and Temporary Employment:  Current Theory and Evidence 
 
  Early theories of the impact of employment protection mandates emphasized that making 
it difficult or expensive to fire workers reduced firms’ incentives to lay off workers and to create 
new jobs.  Of course, as noted earlier, if wages are flexible, then firing costs can be capitalized in 
lower initial wages, leaving firms’ incentives to offer new jobs unchanged, as long as firing costs 
take the form of actual severance payments to workers (Lazear 1990).  However, if market 
imperfections such as wage floors or worker liquidity constraints prevent such a wage 
adjustment from occurring, then higher firing costs will lead to a greater disincentive to create 
jobs.  Moreover, to the extent that employment protection mandates take the form of 
cumbersome regulations rather than payments to workers, there will again be a less than fully 
compensating decline in wages, although wages may well be affected in a general equilibrium 
sense.  Under these circumstances, the net effect on the unemployment rate will be theoretically 
indeterminate, since firing costs will lower both layoffs and job creation (Bertola 1990, 1992).  
  4But, the negative effects on job creation are expected to be disproportionately felt by new 
entrants, while incumbent workers are most directly affected by the negative impact of 
employment protection mandates on layoffs.  Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002) in fact find that 
more extensive employment protection does disproportionately raise young men’s and young 
women’s unemployment rates, other things equal.  And Autor, Donohue and Schwab (2004) find 
similar results for states in the US that have granted workers the right to sue for wrongful 
discharge.  Specifically, the authors found that this type of wrongful discharge protection 
reduced state employment rates, with the largest effects for women, the young, and the less 
educated.  As shown below, this same theme will inform my analysis of the impact of 
employment protection mandates on temporary employment. 
  More recent theories about employment protection recognize that firms have some rights 
to create temporary jobs which have a fixed duration and which can be terminated at the end of 
their term at relatively low cost or no cost at all.  For example, Blanchard and Landier (2002) 
pose a model in which workers are hired into entry level, temporary jobs, and their productivity 
is observed by the firm.  The firm then must decide whether to keep the worker in a permanent, 
regular job.  Temporary jobs have lower firing costs than permanent jobs.  The authors focus on 
the impact of lowering the firing costs of temporary jobs, while keeping the firing costs of 
permanent jobs the same, as occurred in France’s recent reforms.  Lower firing costs for 
temporary jobs or higher firing costs for permanent jobs both reduce the likelihood that a 
temporary job will be converted into a permanent one.
5
  Recent empirical research has examined the impact of firing costs on the incidence of 
temporary employment as well as the characteristics of such jobs and the workers in them.  
Specifically, Booth, Dolado and Frank (2002) use aggregate data to find that across 14 OECD 
countries for the 1980s and the 1990s, the fraction of employment that was in temporary jobs 
was significantly positively correlated with the OECD’s index of strictness of regular 
employment protection mandates, as the theory outlined above predicts.  However, the authors 
                                                           
5  See Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) and Güell (2003) for theoretical models with a similar prediction. 
  5also found that the incidence of temporary employment was significantly positively correlated 
with the strictness of temporary employment regulation as well, a finding that is not consistent 
with this theory.  The resolution of this apparent paradox was found by estimating a multiple 
regression including both permanent and temporary protection mandate indexes on the right 
hand side.  The results continued to show a significantly positive effect on temporary 
employment of permanent employment protection laws but no effect of temporary employment 
protection.  The authors then suggest that regulations on temporary employment protection don’t 
play a role in influencing the incidence of temporary jobs.  Rather, the main factor is the 
strictness of permanent employment protection regulations.  Within the US, similar results have 
been found for the overall impact of employment protection.  Specifically, Autor (2003) 
concluded that a state’s granting workers the right to sue over wrongful termination led to an 
increase in the temporary help services industry employment, all else equal.   
  In contrast to Booth, Dolado and Frank’s (2002) findings that temporary employment 
regulations have no impact, Blanchard and Landier (2002) show that in France the transition 
probability from temporary to permanent jobs fell in the 1980s and the 1990s as the protections 
for temporary jobs were being relaxed, a prediction of the theory outlined above.  Of course, the 
overall labor market was deteriorating in France at the same time, making a conclusion about the 
impact of the reforms tentative.  Indeed, Holmlund and Storrie (2002) find that the recession in 
Sweden in the 1990s was a major cause of the rise in the incidence of temporary employment 
there. 
  While not formally estimating the impact of firing costs on the relative incidence of 
temporary employment, the OECD (2002) and Petrongolo (2004) present some descriptive 
results on temporary jobs that are related to the present work.  Specifically, the OECD (2002, p. 
138) notes that among workers, temporary employment tends to be concentrated among the 
young, women, and the less educated.  And Petrongolo (2004) finds that women tend be 
overrepresented in temporary work. 
  6  In this paper, I extend existing theories and evidence on the impact of employment 
protection to examine its relative impact on different demographic groups.  As discussed below, 
the basic theoretical setup in Blanchard and Landier (2002) can be shown to lead to a prediction 
that more stringent regulation of permanent employment tends to cause a higher gap in the 
incidence of permanent employment between recent labor market entrants and more experienced 
workers, as well as a higher relative incidence of joblessness among these workers.  Moreover, I 
use microdata from several countries with varying degrees of employment protection strictness, 
allowing me to control for country-specific effects as well as observable heterogeneity across 
individuals in estimating the relative effects of protection mandates on temporary employment. 
 
III.  Employment Protection and the Relative Incidence of Temporary Employment:  
Theoretical Considerations 
 
One can use the logic of Blanchard and Landier’s (2002) model to study the impact of 
employment protection on the relative incidence of temporary employment and joblessness 
among recent labor market entrants and experienced workers.  In Blanchard and Landier’s 
(2002) model all entry level jobs start with the same productivity y0.  Then after a period of 
unspecified duration, the firm receives an observation y on the worker’s productivity.  The firm 
then has the option of turning the job into a permanent one or terminating the worker and 
replacing him/her.  Blanchard and Landier (2002) show that the firm’s optimal policy is to set a 
threshold observed productivity level y* above which the worker is kept in a permanent job and 
below which the worker is terminated.  This is analogous to the reservation wage policy in 
models of job search.  To analyze the impact of firing costs on the gap in the incidence of 
permanent work between new entrants and experienced labor market participants, let cp be firing 
costs for a permanent job, ct be firing costs for a temporary job, and let y*(cp, ct) be the 
productivity threshold the firm requires in order to convert a temporary job to a permanent one, 
where ∂y*/∂cp>0 and ∂y*/∂ct<0. 
  7Under these assumptions, the probability that a current spell of temporary employment is 
converted into a permanent job is:  
1)  Prob (y>y*(cp, ct))=1-F(y*(cp, ct)), 
where F(-) is the distribution function for productivity.   
  We may now compare the impact of firing costs for permanent jobs on the relative 
incidence of permanent and temporary employment of experienced workers who have been in 
the labor market for, say, N>1 periods, and recent entrants who have been in the labor market for 
only one period.  For simplicity, suppose initially that everyone is employed in each period, an 
assumption that will soon be relaxed.  Then after one period in the labor market, the probability 
that a worker is still in a temporary job is: 
 
2) Prob(temporary job | one period of total experience) = F(y*),  
 
suppressing the arguments of y*.  Following Blanchard and Landier’s (2002) assumption that 
permanent jobs only end in retirement and that in each period, a worker in a new temporary job 
has the same probability of meeting the productivity threshold, the probability that one is in a 
temporary job after N periods of employment, assuming that retirement has not yet occurred is
6: 
 
3) Prob (temporary job | N periods of total experience) = (F(y*))
N. 
 
  From 1)-3), the impact of firing costs for permanent jobs on the relative incidence of 
temporary employment among recent entrants and those with N years of experience is: 
4)  ∂[F(y*) - (F(y*))
N]/∂cp = f(y*)∂y*/∂cp – NF(y*)
N-1f(y*)∂y*/∂cp, where f(-) is the density 
function for F(-). 
  According to 4), a rise in cp lowers the relative probability of recent entrants’ working in 
a permanent job (versus more experienced workers) if and only if: 
                                                           
6  These assumptions are made for simplicity.  Below, I discuss the implications of relaxing some of them.   
  85) 0<f(y*)∂y*/∂cp – NF(y*)
N-1f(y*)∂y*/∂cp =f(y*)∂y*/∂cp[1- NF(y*)
N-1]. 
  Since higher firing costs cp raise the threshold productivity level y*, inequality 5) holds if 
and only if: 
6) lnF(y*)<ln(1/N)/(N-1).   
By l’Hôpital’s rule, the right hand side of 6) approaches zero (from below) as N gets large.  As 
long as F(y*)<1 (i.e. there is some positive probability that temporary jobs become extended into 
permanent jobs), eventually for large enough N, 6) will hold.  This result make intuitive sense, 
since for large N, the probability that a worker with N periods of experience will not have landed 
a permanent job becomes arbitrarily low.  Of course, if the N required to satisfy (6) is large 
relative to the length of one’s work life, then higher cp may not raise the gap in permanent 
employment between experienced and inexperienced workers.  Thus, whether (6) holds in reality 
is an empirical question, although the limit argument just outlined shows that it will hold 
asymptotically.  From the result that ∂y*/∂ct<0, a fall in firing costs from temporary jobs has the 
same qualitative effect as a rise in firing costs from permanent jobs. 
  The scenario just described assumes that there is no on the job learning.  Workers keep 
entering temporary jobs until they get a good enough productivity draw to induce their employer 
to convert the job into a permanent one.  If workers acquire general human capital in these 
temporary jobs, then the conclusion that higher firing costs raise the difference in the incidence 
of temporary work between recent entrants and more experienced workers is reinforced.  This is 
the case since more experienced workers who have only had temporary jobs up to now have 
more human capital than less experienced workers in temporary jobs.  This implies that the 
instantaneous hazard for leaving a temporary for a permanent job rises with experience.  This 
effect will be less important the more easily junior workers can get permanent jobs (i.e., the 
lower firing costs are).   
The basic logic of this analysis of experience and the incidence of permanent work is that 
more experienced workers get more chances to land a permanent job, even if there is no on the 
job learning.  One scenario in which this makes sense is one where the productivity draw is 
  9match-specific.  If a worker doesn’t get a good draw, this outcome does not prejudice future 
firms against the worker.  However, it is also possible that future firms may take a worker’s 
failure to secure a permanent job as a negative indicator of the worker’s productivity.  In an 
extreme case, this signal may be so strong as to eliminate the worker’s future chances of getting 
a permanent job and thus make more experienced workers no more likely to qualify for a 
permanent job than less experienced workers.  In this extreme case, everyone gets exactly one 
chance to qualify for a permanent job.  Therefore, the incidence of permanent employment for 
those with one year of experience will be the same as the incidence with any level of experience 
greater than one.  In such a case, high firing costs would have no effect on the experience gap in 
the incidence of permanent jobs.  The intermediate case in which past failure to secure a 
permanent job provides some information to future employers about the current worker’s 
productivity but where the worker still has a chance to eventually get a permanent job is perhaps 
more likely.  In such a scenario, the probability of permanent employment could still approach 
one as experience rises and therefore higher firing costs could still raise the experience gap in 
permanent employment.   
The above reasoning suggests that even if one is able to find a job every period, higher 
firing costs cp will eventually raise the experience gap in the incidence of permanent 
employment.  I have assumed for simplicity that one is employed each period.  In the likely 
event that it takes time to locate a job when one enters the labor market or has left a job, then we 
expect employment protection mandates to lower the relative propensity of inexperienced and 
low skill individuals to be employed, since the exit rate from temporary jobs is likely to be 
higher than the exit rate from permanent jobs.  Finally, all of the predictions mentioned above 
become weaker the more downwardly-flexible starting wages are, using reasoning discussed 
earlier.  Thus, the effects of EPL on joblessness and temporary employment among workers are 
expected to become stronger in countries with more downward wage rigidity. 
 
III.  Institutional Setting and Data 
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  As noted earlier, I use 1994-98 IALS data for Canada, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States to study the impact of employment 
protection on the relative incidence of temporary employment among demographic groups.  As 
Tables 1 and 2 indicate, these countries had very different regulations on job security in the 
1990s.  For example, Table 1 shows that Italy had much higher mandated severance pay both for 
no-fault dismissals and compensation for unfair dismissals than the other countries.  The 
countries also differed with respect to the amount of notice a worker must be given before he/she 
can be dismissed, with employers in Finland being required to give 6 months notice, and those in 
the US not required to give any.  Procedural delays were especially common in the Netherlands.  
Finally, the OECD provided an overall indicator of regular employment protection strictness, 
with Italy (2.8) and the Netherlands (3.1) at the top of my group of seven countries, followed by 
Finland at 2.1, with Switzerland, Canada and the UK in a group at 0.8-1.2, and the US with the 
least protection (0.2). 
  Table 2 shows the OECD’s measures of regulation of temporary employment.  In 
Canada, the UK and the US, there is no limit on the maximum number of fixed term contracts a 
firm is allowed to offer a worker.  Italy is the only country in the group with a limit on the 
accumulated duration of fixed term contracts or any significant barriers to employment by 
temporary work agencies.  Across countries, the overall temporary employment protection index 
and that for permanent employment have a correlation of 0.74, which is significant at the 5.7% 
level, despite the presence of only seven observations.  The similarity of the countries’ rankings 
for their regulation of permanent and temporary employment will make it difficult to distinguish 
the effects of these two types of regulation. 
I use the IALS microdata to study the effects of employment protection mandates on 
permanent employment.  The IALS is the result of an international cooperative effort, conducted 
over the 1994-8 period, to devise an instrument to compare the cognitive skills of adults across a 
  11number of countries.
7  Each country is represented by a single random cross-section taken in one 
year, with the exception of Switzerland, for which the German- and French-speaking subsamples 
were suveryed in 1994, while the Italian-speaking subsample was surveyed in 1998.  The other 
countries’ survey years were as follows:  Canada, the Netherlands, and the US-1994; the UK-
1996; and Finland and Italy-1998.  Because the design is a single cross-section, I am unable to 
analyze the frequency and duration of temporary employment.  Rather, I in effect study the stock 
of temporary jobs, an analysis conceptually similar to studying the stock of unemployed workers.  
It should be noted that any national differences in the overall duration or frequency of temporary 
employment will be controlled for by the inclusion of country dummies in the basic models.  The 
sampling frame was similar across countries, with the target population being those 16 years and 
older who were not in institutions or the military.
8  In addition to test scores, data are available 
on gender, immigrant status, employment status including whether one was in a temporary or a 
regular job, schooling, age, industry, and occupation.  
Of unique interest in the IALS is its measurement of cognitive skills.  This was 
accomplished through three tests that were administered to all respondents in their respective 
home languages.  These tests were designed to measure prose, document and quantitative 
literacy and are described in more detail in the Appendix.  Although, in principle, interpreting 
prose or documents, and using mathematics may each require different skills, these skills, as 
measured by the IALS, are in fact highly correlated.  Forming a score for each of the three tests 
(i.e., quantitative, prose, and document literacy) based on the average of the five available 
estimates, I found that these scores were correlated at roughly .9.  Due to this high correlation, in 
the econometric work that follows, I report results based on a measure of cognitive skills which 
is an average of the three average test scores for each individual.   
                                                           
7  For further description of the IALS, see OECD (1998) and USDOE, NCES (1998). 
8  There were some geographic exclusions in some cases, but these were 3% or less of the target population, except 
for Switzerland, where the exclusion of Italian and Rhaeto-Romantic regions, persons in institutions and persons 
without telephones accounted for 11% of the total potential sample.  In all cases, the IALS supplied a set of 
sampling weights, which I used in all analyses, after I adjusted each country’s weights so that the total weight for 
each country was the same.  See the IALS documentation file, available from Statistics Canada. 
  12  Table A1 provides some descriptive information on the employment outcomes analyzed 
here, and Figures 1-4 show bivariate relationships between the OECD’s EPL index for regular 
employment and the incidence of temporary employment in the IALS among wage and salary 
workers.  Table A1 shows that in the population, the incidence of permanent work among men 
ranges from a low of 57% in Finland to 77% in the US, while for women the range is even 
greater—from 32% in Italy to 61% in the US.  These figures of course combine both the 
incidence of work and the incidence of permanent jobs among those with work.  The IALS 
figures for nonemployment are very highly correlated with those in the OECD (1999) for 1998:  
specifically, for the seven countries studied here, the IALS- and OECD-based nonemployment 
rates among men have a correlation of 0.88, those for women are correlated at 0.83, and the 
gender gap in joblessness is correlated at .90 in the two data sources.   
Table A1 also shows the incidence of temporary employment among wage and salary 
workers in the IALS and from the OECD (2002) for 2000.  Overall, in both data sources, the US 
and the UK have a relatively low incidence of temporary work, and Finland has a high incidence.  
The figures from the two data sources are generally consistent with each other, although the 
correlation is less close than it is for joblessness:  temporary employment for men is correlated at 
.57 in the two data sources and the correlation for women is .65.  However, in both the OECD 
(2002) and IALS data, women are more likely to have temporary jobs than men do, and the 
gender gap in temporary is highly correlated in the two data sources at .76.
9  It is of course 
possible that respondents interpreted questions about temporary work differently in the OECD 
data compared to the IALS.  But the inclusion of country dummy variables in the empirical work 
to some degree can correct for such differences.  The fact that the gender gap in temporary work 
is more highly correlated between the IALS and the OECD than the individual figures for men 
                                                           
9  Excluding Italy, which has the largest divergence in temporary employment incidence between the two data 
sources, temporary employment is very highly correlated across the IALS and OECD:  for men, the incidence has a 
correlation of 0.74, for women, the correlation is 0.83, and the gender gap is correlated at 0.91.  As discussed 
below, my basic econometric results for the incidence of temporary employment were very similar when Italy was 
excluded. 
  13and women suggests the usefulness of studying within country differences in temporary 
employment.   
  Figures 1-4 show bivariate relationships between the incidence of permanent 
employment and the OECD’s overall indicator of regular employment protection mandates, 
stratified by gender, age, immigrant status, or cognitive test score level.  The sample includes all 
individuals in the seven countries listed earlier who were employed as wage and salary workers.  
In each case, a regression line is included for each subgroup.  Figure 1 shows declining incidence 
of permanent employment for both men and women as mandated employment protection 
becomes stricter.  Of particular note is that the relationship is stronger for women than for men, 
at least as indicated by the steepness of the regression line.  While women and men are roughly 
equally likely to have permanent jobs if employment protection is minimal, the predicted gap 
grows to about 8 percentage points (about 10%) at the strictest employment protection levels.  
Figure 2 shows the relationship between permanent employment and employment protection for 
16-25 year olds and 46-55 year olds.  The employed young are substantially less likely than 46-
55 year olds to have a permanent job even when employment protection is minimal:  the gap is 
roughly 10 percentage points.  More importantly for the argument here, the gap grows 
substantially as employment protection increases.  Specifically, while the incidence of 
permanent employment for 46-55 year olds is very high at about 95% of employment and is 
uncorrelated with employment protection mandates, permanent employment for the young falls 
sharply when employment protection becomes more stringent.  The latter ranges from about 85% 
when there is little protection to only 60% when protection is at its sample maximum. 
  Figure 3 shows the permanent employment-employment protection relationship broken 
down by immigrant status.  The incidence of permanent employment falls for both natives and 
immigrants, with a steeper decline for immigrants.  While the incidence is about 92-93% for 
immigrants and natives at low levels of employment protection, permanent employment falls to 
85% for natives and about 73-74% for immigrants with high levels of protection.  Finally, Figure 
4 shows the permanent employment-protection relationship for those with low test scores, which 
  14are defined and described in the Appendix, and for others.  I focus on those with low cognitive 
skills because they are most likely affected by wage floors.  Figure 4 shows that individuals with 
low test scores have a slightly lower predicted incidence of permanent employment than others 
do at low levels of protection, with about a one percentage point gap.  The difference widens 
with higher levels of protection to about four percentage points. 
  Figures 1-4 all convey a similar message:  stronger employment protection mandates 
have a more negative relationship with the incidence of permanent employment for low skill 
groups or workers with less experience than for higher skill or more experienced workers.  These 
relationships were predicted by the theoretical reasoning discussed above.  However, while 
suggestive, none of the Figures control for other influences on permanent employment.  The 
econometric analyses in the next sections will implement such controls.   
 
IV.  Empirical Procedures 
 
  To investigate the impact of employment protection mandates, I initially estimate a 
multinomial logit model with a dependent variable that takes on three possible values:  1 for 
nonemployment, 2 for being employed in a temporary job, and 3 for being employed in a 
permanent job.  This procedure allows one to simultaneously estimate the determinants of 
joblessness and the type of contract among those with jobs.  Since it uses the entire adult 
population as the sample, the procedure avoids possible sample selection problems.  The model 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
7) Prob(Permij=1|Zij)/Prob(Nonemployedij=1|Zij)= exp(C1’Zij) ≡ exp(B1’Xij + a11*EPLj +  
a12*EPLj*AGE2635ij + a13*EPLj*AGE3645ij + a14*EPLj*AGE4655ij +  
a15*EPLj*AGE5665ij + a16*EPLj*EDYRSij + a17*EPLj*LEVEL1ij +  
a18*EPLj*FEMALEij + a19*EPLj*IMMIGij)  
 
  158) Prob(Permij=1|Zij)/Prob(Tempij=1|Zij)= exp(C2’Zij) ≡ exp(B2’Xij + a21*EPLj +  
a22*EPLj*AGE2635ij + a23*EPLj*AGE3645ij + a24*EPLj*AGE4655ij +  
a25*EPLj*AGE5665ij + a26*EPLj*EDYRSij + a27*EPLj*LEVEL1ij +  
a28*EPLj*FEMALEij + a29*EPLj*IMMIGij),  
 
where for each person i in country j between 16 and 65 years old, Perm is a dummy variable 
equaling one if one is employed in a permanent job; Nonemployed is a dummy variable equaling 
one if one is not employed; Temp is a dummy variable equaling one if one is employed in a 
temporary job; X is a vector of explanatory variables to be described; EPL is the country’s 
OECD permanent employment protection indicator; AGE2635-AGE5665 are a series of dummy 
variables for age in the ranges 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, and 56-65 respectively (16-25 years old is 
the omitted age category)
10; EDYRS is years of schooling; LEVEL1 is a dummy variable for 
having average IALS test score in the LEVEL 1 (lowest) range; FEMALE is a female dummy 
variable; IMMIG is an immigrant dummy variable; and Z is a vector including all of these 
explanatory variables.   
The explanatory variables in X include main effects for the four age group dummies just 
mentioned, years of schooling, low test score, gender, and immigrant status, as well as a full set 
of interactions of gender and the age, education, low test score and immigrant variables.  
Coefficients a12-a19 and a22-a29 test the hypothesis that employment protection has different 
effects on the indicated demographic or skill group.  Main effects a11 and a22 are included, which 
give the impact of employment protection when the age, education, gender, test score and 
immigrant status variables all equal zero.  Moreover, the model was estimated adjusting the 
IALS individual sampling weights so that each country receives the same total weight, and the 
asymptotic standard errors are corrected for clustering within countries. 
A challenge in doing international comparative labor market research is that many 
institutions occur in clusters, and it may be difficult to pinpoint the effect of one institution such 
                                                           
10  I adopted this age specification because the IALS age data for Canada were only available in categorical form. 
  16as employment protection across a sample of OECD countries (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002).  
With only seven countries to work with here, it is not possible to control for the full set of other 
institutions that could potentially affect the incidence of permanent employment.  But, since the 
key effects I am interested in are the interactions between protection and demographic or skill 
variables, it is possible to replace the protection main effect with a series of country dummies.  
These summarize all other unmeasured influences on the incidence of nonemployment, 
permanent employment or temporary employment.  These include but are not limited to other 
policies and institutions such as taxes, UI, collective bargaining, disability programs, and 
product market regulation, as well as the availability and quality of educational opportunities and 
population characteristics that influence employment outcomes.  Therefore, some versions of the 
model were estimated with country dummies.   
Even with country dummies, however, other institutions such as collective bargaining 
coverage may have indirect effects on the relative incidence of nonemployment or permanent 
employment across demographic or skill groups.  For example, if unions compress wages (Blau 
and Kahn 1996), then collective bargaining may accentuate the effects of employment protection 
in shutting younger, female, immigrant or less skilled workers out of employment or out of 
permanent jobs.  Therefore, in some models, I allow for interactions between employment 
protection and 1994 collective bargaining coverage and the demographic variables, as well as of 
course collective bargaining main effects, lower-level interactions between collective bargaining 
and the controls, and an interaction between collective bargaining and protection.
11   
The sample for estimating the multinomial logit model of course includes all individuals 
whether or not they are employed.  This design therefore does not allow one to control for sector 
or type of employment in estimating the probability that one’s job is temporary.  Including 
occupation and industry can control for compositional differences across countries.  If, for 
example, countries with stricter employment protection laws also have relatively large sectors in 
which temporary work is common for reasons other than mandated protection, then failure to 
                                                           
11  Collective bargaining coverage information is taken from OECD (1997). 
  17control for sector may produce a spurious negative relationship between protection and 
permanent jobs.  This example illustrates the value of using microdata, which allow one to 
control for compositional factors.  In addition, the theory of temporary protection outlined earlier 
is best applied to wage and salary workers, who have employers making decisions about whether 
to keep them, and self-employed workers may interpret a question about temporary employment 
differently from wage and salary workers.  I therefore additionally estimate the determinants that 
one’s job is permanent given that one is a wage and salary worker, using a logit model with the 
same controls as in equations 7) and 8), augmented by a vector of industry and occupation 
dummy variables and their interactions with a female dummy variable.
12  This design allows one 
to control for sector and type of employment.  On the other hand, employment protection laws 
may themselves lead to changes in the relative sizes of sectors if they raise costs in some 
industries or occupations more than in others.  In this scenario, the sectoral composition is part of 
the impact of employment protection laws.  Thus, the multinomial logit results which of course 
do not control for sector can be seen as reduced forms where institutions affect the sizes of 
various sectors, as well as the individual’s choices between employment and schooling.   
As noted, restricting the sample to employed wage and salary workers allows one to 
focus on the theories discussed earlier and in effect control for labor supply and school 
enrollment choices that may be confounded with employment protection mandates.  However, 
since the availability of schooling opportunities could affect the relative incidence of temporary 
employment among employed youth, particularly those with high cognitive ability levels who 
would be the most likely to enroll, I also test the robustness of the basic results to exclusion of 
those age 16-25 years old.  This sample is not likely to be directly greatly affected by schooling 
                                                           
12  The industries are:  1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; 2. Mining and quarrying; 3. Manufacturing; 4. 
Electricity, gas and water; 5. Construction; 6. Wholesale and retail trade; 7. Transport, storage and communication; 
8. Finance, insurance, real estate and business services; and 9. Community, social and personal services.  The 
occupations are:  1. Legislators, senior officials and managers; 2. Professionals; 3. Technicians and associate 
professionals; 4. Clerks; 5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 6. Skilled agricultural and fishery 
workers; 7. Craft and related trades workers; 8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers; and 9. Elementary 
occupations.  In each case, category number 1 is the omitted category. 
  18opportunities and therefore provides an additional, sharper test of the basic hypotheses outlined 
above. 
As discussed further below, I also attempted several other specifications in estimating the 
probability of permanent employment among wage and salary workers.  First, in some models I 
also control for temporary employment regulation and its interactions with age, education, test 
score, gender and nativity status.  Efforts to disentangle the effects of regular and temporary 
employment regulation must remain tentative, due to the previously-mentioned high correlation 
between permanent and temporary employment regulation.  Second, I test whether the 
demographic effects of employment protection differ by gender.  This might be expected, since 
women earn lower pay than men and are therefore more likely to be constrained by wage floors.  
Third, since the estimation sample consists of employed workers, I also address the issue of 
possible selection bias.  For example, in countries where employment rates are relatively low, 
the employed workers may have particularly high work motivation or unmeasured skills (relative 
to the population as a whole) compared to countries with high employment rates.  Workers with 
high levels of work motivation or unmeasured skills may be more likely than otherwise to obtain 
permanent employment.  Since employment-population differences across countries are much 
larger for young people and women than for prime age males (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002), 
such selection issues may directly affect my protection-demographic group interactions.  
Therefore, as discussed in more detail below, in some specifications, I address this possible 
selection bias.  Fourth, in some analyses, I disaggregate the OECD’s overall protection index 
into its component parts, reflecting severance pay, unfair dismissal pay, mandatory notice of 
layoffs, and procedural delays.  Finally, I investigated the sensitivity of the results to exclusion 
of countries with very high or very low levels of employment protection. 
 
V.  Results:  Full Sample of All Individuals 
 
  19  Tables 3,4 and A2 contain multinomial logit results for the simultaneous analysis of 
nonemployment, temporary employment and permanent employment.  Table 3, Panels A and B 
contain multinomial logit coefficients and risk ratios (i.e. the effect of the variable on the relative 
probability of the two indicated outcomes).  Panels C and D show results for the “unconditional” 
(i.e., conditional only on the explanatory variables) probability of nonemployment or permanent 
employment which are implied by the multinomial logit coefficients.
13  Looking first at 
nonemployment, Table 3, Panel C shows that employment protection raises the relative 
likelihood of employment for prime age vs. young individuals, men vs. women, and natives vs. 
immigrants.  The results are similar whether or not I control for country dummies.
14  The 
magnitudes are moderately large, particularly for age and immigrant status.  Specifically, the 
units in Panel C are employment probability effects, and the impact of EPL on nonemployment 
for 36-45 year olds vs. 16-25 years, for example, ranges from -7.6 to -7.7 percentage points, and 
the average joblessness incidence for the sample, is about 36%.  Effects appear small for 
education and low test score, although the signs are opposite to what one would expect.  Effects 
are somewhat larger for women and even more so for immigrants.  Regarding statistical 
significance, the age interactions are highly significant as a group (although not individually), 
the EPL interactions with education and test score are insignificant to marginally significant, the 
EPL gender interactions are about 1.5 times their asymptotic standard errors, and EPL-immigrant 
interactions are highly significant.  Overall, then, I find that stronger EPL lowers the relative 
employment of the young and immigrants, with a marginally negative effect on women.   
As discussed earlier, if there are wage floors, then Lazear’s (1990) analysis predicts that 
employment protection mandates will have even larger effects than otherwise in shutting out low 
                                                           
13  For example, using equations (7) and (8), recalling that Z is the full set of explanatory variables, C1 is the full 
vector of coefficients for equation (7), and C2 is the full vector of coefficients for equation (8), the probability that 
one is employed in a permanent job is: 
 
Prob(Perm|Z) = 1/(exp(-C1’Z) + exp(-C2’Z)).  The other “unconditional” probabilities can be similarly calculated, 
and the partial derivatives of all of these probabilities with respect to the Z variables can also be computed. 
14  Inclusion of country dummies implies of course that the main effect of employment protection can no longer be 
included. 
  20skill workers from employment generally or permanent employment.  I tested this notion by 
adding a series of three way interactions between collective bargaining coverage, employment 
protection and the demographic and skill variables in the model.  In addition, I added lower level 
interactions between collective bargaining coverage and the demographic/skill variables as well 
as a main collective bargaining coverage effect (CB Cov) and a (CB Cov)-EPL interaction.  
Table 4, Panel A shows that the negative EPL employment effects for youth become 
significantly larger in magnitude in countries with high levels of collective bargaining, effects 
which are also large in magnitude.
15  Moreover, the EPL*CB Cov interaction effects for 
nonemployment are negative (and marginally significant) for schooling and positive (and 
marginally significant controlling for country dummies) for low test score.  These results imply 
that EPL has a more negative effect on the relative employment of the less educated and the low 
skilled in countries with higher levels of collective bargaining coverage. 
  Tables 3, 4 and A2 also contain findings for the incidence of permanent employment, the 
primary focus of this paper.  Table 3, Panels B and D show that stronger EPL raises the relative 
incidence of permanent employment relative to temporary employment (Panel B) or the rest of 
the population (Panel D) by more for prime age vs. young workers, men and natives.  EPL also 
lowers the relative probability that employed workers with low test scores will have a permanent 
job.  Again, the age interactions are highly significant as a group, the effects for women and 
immigrants are significant or marginally so, and the effects for those with low test score are 
significant conditional on employment (Table 3, Panel B).  The magnitudes of these effects are 
again moderately large and similar absolutely to the effects on nonemployment (the incidence in 
the population of permanent employment is about 57% and temporary employment is 7%).  For 
example, Table 3, Panel D shows that EPL raises the relative likelihood that 36-45 year olds in 
the population will have a permanent job by 8.6 percentage points relative to 16-25 year olds.  
The effects for men and immigrants are 3.7 and 7.1 percentage points, respectively. 
                                                           
15  Appendix Table A2 shows the raw multinomial coefficients upon which the entries in Table 4 are based. 
  21Tables 4 and A2 show that the EPL effects on permanent jobs for prime age vs. the 
young or EPL interaction effects with education are significantly larger in magnitude where 
collective bargaining coverage is higher, whether relative to the whole population (Table 4) or 
the employed (Table A2).  And, Table A2, Panel B shows that EPL raises the relative probability 
of permanent vs. temporary employment for men and natives by significantly more in countries 
with high levels of collective bargaining coverage.  As was the case for employment, these three 
way interaction effects are also large in magnitude.  Finally, Table A2, Panel B shows the 
counterintuitive result of a positive EPL-collective bargaining coverage-Low Test Score 
interaction for permanent vs. temporary employment.  Thus, the effects of skill level are 
somewhat ambiguous with opposite effects of schooling and test scores.  But the findings for 
youth, women and immigrants do suggest that EPL and collective bargaining interact to lower 
these groups’ incidence of finding a permanent job.  The next section provides further evidence 
on the impact of protection mandates on permanent employment among wage and salary 
workers, allowing for a wider set of controls. 
 
VI.  Results:  Employed Wage and Salary Workers 
 
  A.  Basic Results 
 
  Table 5 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit analyses of the determinants of 
permanent employment, with the sample restricted to employed wage and salary workers.  I vary 
the specifications in two ways:  i) inclusion or exclusion of industry and occupation dummies 
and their interactions with gender; ii) inclusion or exclusion of country dummies.  The logit 
results are the partial derivatives of the dependent variable evaluated at the sample mean 
incidence of permanent employment; the OLS results of course are already in probability units.  
Overall, Table 5 shows that all else equal, protection has more positive effects on permanent 
employment for older workers, those scoring above the lowest level on the IALS literacy tests, 
  22men and native born workers, as our earlier theoretical discussion predicted, and as found in the 
multinomial results for the whole population.  The interaction effects are significant in almost 
every case for age (except for age 26-35 in the logits), in every case for gender, and usually 
significant or marginally so for literacy and immigrant status.  Moreover, the interaction effects 
increase algebraically in each case with rising age beyond 35, suggesting rising relative 
protection as workers age.
16  The OLS results show a significant interaction effect for age 26-35, 
while the logits show a small and insignificant interaction for this group (relative of course to the 
16-25 year old omitted group).  Effects of education are never large in absolute value or 
statistically significant.  It is reassuring that the basic results hold up upon controlling for 
country specific effects and industry and occupation dummies, as well as industry and 
occupation interacted with gender.  The basic effects I am reporting are thus not an artifact of the 
sectoral composition of employment.
17
  To assess the magnitude of these interaction effects, it is useful to compare the impact of 
age, cognitive ability, gender and immigrant status on permanent employment in a country with 
a low level of employment protection like the United States and one with a high level of 
protection such as the Netherlands.  The difference in the OECD’s employment protection index 
between these two countries is 2.9.  Table 6 shows the impact of changing employment 
protection by this extent on age, gender, cognitive ability and nativity-based gaps in permanent 
employment, using the logit estimates with country dummies and industry and occupation 
controls from Table 5.  In addition, Table 6 shows the actual incidence of permanent 
                                                           
16  The implied partial derivatives for the probability of a permanent job given that one is employed, based on the 
multinomial logit models of Table 3 were very similar to those based on the logits in Table 5. 
17  I also tested a series of EPL-demographic interactions with employment in agriculture and employment in 
manufacturing (included in the logits simultaneously).  These models were estimated based on the notion that 
temporary employment may be especially common in farming and that manufacturing may be a sector with 
particularly strong protections for insiders.  There was a significant positive interaction with education for 
permanent employment in agriculture and a significant negative interaction with low test score in manufacturing.  In 
each of these cases, protection had a disproportionately positive effect leading to permanent work for skilled 
workers.  The age interactions were also positive in each sector, although they were not significant individually; 
however, for manufacturing, they were significant as a group.  These age point estimates indicated that in 
agriculture and manufacturing, protection had a disproportionately large effect leading young workers to have a 
high incidence of temporary work. 
  23employment across these dimensions for the Netherlands and the United States.  In order to 
gauge the importance of employment protection, one can compare the effect of the Dutch-US 
difference in employment protection on these gaps in permanent employment with the actual 
Dutch-US difference in the permanent employment gaps.   
Beginning with the effect of age, Table 6 shows that among those with wage and salary 
jobs, only 67.6% of 16-25 year olds in the Netherlands have permanent jobs, compared to 81.1% 
in the US.  Among the more prime age 46-55 year old group, the difference in permanent 
employment incidence is much smaller:  95.7% of this group in the Netherlands have a 
permanent job, while 96.2% of employed 46-55 year olds in the US have one.  Thus, the actual 
age gap in permanent employment in the Netherlands is fully 28.1 percentage points, compared 
to only 15.2 percentage points in the US, for an Italy-US difference of 12.9 percentage points.  
Table 5’s logit estimate for the model with country dummies and industry-occupation controls 
implies that raising the employment protection mandate from the US to the Dutch level raises the 
permanent employment gap between 46-55 year olds and 16-25 year olds by 12.6 percentage 
points, a highly significant effect with an asymptotic standard error of 3.2 percentage points.  
Table 6 shows that this point estimate is fully 97.5% of the actual Dutch-US difference in the 
permanent employment gap between these two age groups.  The other logit models yield 
predicted changes in this gap of 8.5 to 11.6 percentage points, and the OLS results are uniformly 
larger than any of the logit results.  Using any of these parameter estimates, one can conclude 
that employment protection is an important cause of the fact that young people in the 
Netherlands have a much lower relative incidence of permanent employment than young people 
in the US. 
Table 6 shows similar results for the degree to which employment protection explains 
Dutch-US differences in the gender gap, cognitive ability gap, and immigrant-native gap in the 
incidence of permanent employment.  Specifically, men in each country have a higher incidence 
of permanent employment than women do, and the gender gap is 4.1 percentage points higher in 
the Netherlands (with rounding).  Changing employment protection mandates from the US to the 
  24Dutch level raises the gender gap in permanent employment by 2.9 percentage points, again a 
highly significant effect that is more than nine times its asymptotic standard error.  The impact 
accounts for 71% of the actual Dutch-US difference in the gender gap using the fully specified 
logit model in Table 5.  All of the other models in Table 5 show larger effects than this.  Table 6 
shows that in the Netherlands, those with low cognitive ability are less likely than others to have 
a permanent job, while in the US, they are actually slightly more likely.  The skill gap in 
permanent employment is 4.0 percentage points higher in the Netherlands than in the US, and the 
employment protection effect is 126% of this, using the last logit model in Table 5, although in 
this case the effect is not statistically significant.  Again, the other models imply larger effects 
than this, some of which are statistically significant.  Finally, natives are 6.0 percentage points 
more likely in the Netherlands and 0.3 percentage points less likely in the US than immigrants to 
have permanent jobs, for a 6.4 percentage point Dutch-US difference in the native-immigrant 
gap (with rounding).  Using the last logit model in Table 5, I conclude that protection explains 
101% of this difference, an effect that is twice its asymptotic standard error.  The other 
parameter estimates in Table 5 imply a range for this estimate of 68% to 101%.  Decomposition 
results for the US vs. the Italy, another country in my sample with stringent EPL, were very 
similar to those in Table 6. 
 
B.  Alternative Specifications 
 
In this section, I explore some more detailed specifications of the basic model in order to 
examine the roles of collective bargaining, gender, temporary employment protection, and 
possible sample selection bias.  Moreover, I present results where the protection measure is 
disaggregated into its components as well as exploring the sensitivity of the results to exclusion 
of countries with very high or very low levels of employment protection or exclusion of young 
people. 
 
  251.  Collective Bargaining Interactions 
 
  Table 7 shows logit results of models with similar collective bargaining interactions to 
those used in Tables 4 and A2.
18  The results are in fact very similar to those shown in Table A2, 
Panel B, which displayed EPL-collective bargaining interaction effects for the probability of 
permanent vs. temporary employment among the whole population.  In contrast, Table 7 shows 
these effects among wage and salary workers with controls for sector and sector interacted with 
gender.  This design is potentially useful in the event that a country’s level of collective 
bargaining coverage is affected by its occupational-industrial structure, although as noted earlier, 
institutions can also affect a country’s sectoral composition.  In any case, Table 7 shows very 
strong three way interaction effects for age and nativity status.  Specifically, more stringent 
employment protection on regular jobs raises the age gap and the immigrant-native gap in 
permanent employment substantially more when collective bargaining coverage is high than 
when it is low, and these three way interactions are highly statistically significant in all 
specifications.  For example, using the difference between Dutch and US collective bargaining 
coverage of 0.63 (81% vs. 18%) and using the most fully specified model in Table 7, an increase 
in employment protection from the US to the Dutch level widens the age 46-55 vs. age 16-25 
gap in permanent employment by 34.2 percentage points more with the higher collective 
bargaining level.  The native-immigrant permanent employment gap is widened by 24.7 
percentage points more in the high collective bargaining coverage than in the low collective 
bargaining environment. 
In addition, the three way interactions with female are negative, large in magnitude and 
highly significant when I don’t control for sector, as was the case for the whole population 
(Table A2).  However, controlling for sector reduces the female interactions to a very small and 
insignificant level.  Thus, to the extent that EPL and CB Cov interact to shut women out of 
permanent jobs, these effects occur across industries and occupations but not within them.  On 
                                                           
18  OLS results for these and the other specifications were largely similar and are available upon request. 
  26the other hand, if women’s sectoral representation is not affected by these institutions, then the 
results suggest that EPL and collective bargaining don’t have strong interaction effects for 
women.  Finally, the three way interactions involving education and cognitive ability go in 
opposite directions as was the case for the model for the whole population (Table A2).  On the 
one hand, the positive three way interactions with education imply that protection widens the 
highly educated-less highly educated permanent employment gap more where there is extensive 
collective bargaining, as the wage floor argument would suggest; on the other hand, I also obtain 
positive interactions with low test scores, implying the opposite. 
Overall, then, I find that collective bargaining coverage accentuates the employment 
protection effects that reduce the incidence of permanent jobs for the young and immigrants, 
with possibly similar effects for women to the extent that sectoral composition is an outcome 
determined by labor market institutions.  These findings can be seen as complementary to earlier 
work that finds that higher collective bargaining coverage leads to lower employment levels for 
women and youth (Bertola, Blau and Kahn 2002).   
 
2.  Gender Interactions 
 
  The basic model in Table 5 assumes that employment protection has the same effect on 
women’s relative incidence of permanent employment (i.e., versus comparable men), regardless 
of their age, cognitive ability, education, or nativity status.  However, since women are more 
likely than men to be recent labor market entrants, as well as constrained by wage floors, one 
might expect these gender effects of employment protection to be stronger in the lower wage or 
lower skill groups.  Indeed, Table 5 shows that, overall, employment protection lowers women’s 
relative likelihood of permanent employment.  Table 8 shows logit models where I allow the 
effects of employment protection by age, education, cognitive ability, and nativity to vary by 
gender.  The three way interactions involving gender, employment protection and the other 
  27demographic or skill variables are all insignificant and small in magnitude except for a 
significant, negative interaction with nativity status.
19   
Looking at the effect of protection on immigrant men and women, we see in Table 8 that 
protection has small, positive, sometimes significant effects on the relative incidence of 
permanent employment for male immigrants, but the three way interaction with female is 
significantly negative.  Moreover, the effect of protection on the female immigrant relative 
incidence (vs. female natives) of permanent employment (i.e. adding the protection-immigrant 
two way interaction term and the three way protection-female-immigrant term) is large in 
magnitude, ranging from -0.047 to -0.059 and is always statistically significant at better than the 
4.6% level.  When I calculated the average effect of protection on the gap for native-born men 
vs. native-born women (at the mean values for the age dummies, education, and test score), I 
continued to find that stricter protection raises this gap; this effect was of the same magnitude as 
the female interaction effects in Table 5.  Moreover, this difference was usually statistically 
significant.  Thus, protection reduces the chances that both native and immigrant women will 
obtain permanent employment, relative to native men and immigrant men, respectively, with a 
larger effect for immigrants.  The findings in Table 8 suggest that employment protection 
reduces the incidence of permanent jobs for employed immigrant women, but does not do so for 
immigrant men.  Perhaps immigrant women have especially low skill levels or low levels of 
labor market experience.
20  Thus it might not be surprising that employed immigrant women’s 
incidence of permanent jobs would be especially affected by EPL.
21
                                                           
19  In addition to being small and individually insignificant, the gender-EPL-age interactions were also insignificant 
as a group in every case.  
20  I also estimated the multinomial logit models of Table 3 with the same female interactions as in Table 8.  The 
only significant female interactions for the probability of nonemployment (inferred from the multinomial logit 
coefficients) were a significantly negative interaction with EPL*years of schooling and a significantly negative 
interaction with EPL*immigrant.  In the former case, EPL* years of schooling had a (puzzling) significantly 
positive effect for men but a small and insignificant effect for women; in the latter case, EPL raised immigrants’ 
relative probability of joblessness significantly for both men and women but by significantly more for men than 
women.  While the lower skills for immigrant women might lead us to expect a more positive effect of EPL on their 
joblessness relative to immigrant men, perhaps immigrant women’s employment is already low due to labor supply 
considerations. 
21  I also investigated whether the collective bargaining-protection interaction for immigrants shown in Table 7 was 
significantly different for male vs. female immigrants.  In supplementary collective bargaining-interaction models, I 
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3.  Temporary Employment Regulation 
 
  The theory outlined earlier suggests that greater protection of temporary employment 
should have the opposite effects of regular employment protection on employed workers’ 
propensities to be in permanent jobs.  While countries differ with respect to their regulation of 
temporary employment, as noted earlier the OECD’s (1999) measures of such regulation are 
highly correlated with permanent employment protection mandates, with a correlation coefficient 
of 0.74.  Table 9 shows what happens when I add the temporary employment index and its 
interactions with age, education, cognitive ability, gender, and immigrant status to the basic 
model in Table 5.  There are rarely any significant effects of temporary employment protection.  
These occur only in the age 46-55 interactions for three of the four models shown in Table 9, and 
they go in the wrong direction of raising the relative likelihood that people in this age group will 
have a permanent job.  Moreover, the basic regular employment protection interaction effects 
hold up in sign but are less statistically significant than in Table 5.  Only the negative 
interactions with female and immigrants hold up in statistical significance.  And when I 
estimated the basic Table 5 models with the permanent employment protection terms replaced by 
temporary employment regulation, the results were virtually identical to those in Table 5.  These 
findings and those in Table 9 reinforce Booth, Dolado and Frank’s (2002) conclusion that the 
OECD’s index of temporary employment protection does not add any information beyond what 
is contained in its index of permanent employment protection. 
 
4.  Sample Selection Bias 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
added a three way gender-protection-immigrant, a three way gender-collective bargaining-immigrant, and a four 
way collective bargaining-gender-protection-immigrant interaction term.  The model was therefore saturated with 
respect to CB Cov, gender, immigrant status and EPL.  In all cases, both the three way collective bargaining-
protection-immigrant and the four way collective bargaining-gender-protection-immigrant interaction effects were 
negative; however, while the three way interaction was sometimes significant, the four way interaction was never 
significant (the joint hypothesis that both interactions were zero was always rejected).  Thus, the collective 
bargaining-protection interaction was not significantly different for male and female immigrants. 
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  As discussed earlier, the differing employment to population ratios across the countries in 
my sample raise the possibility that my basic models interacting employment protection and 
demographic groups may be influenced by sample selection bias.  The IALS data show, for 
example, that among those who were not self-employed, employment to population ratios were 
highest for Switzerland among men and the US among women.  One method to adjust for sample 
selection is to build a two equation model of employment and permanent employment along the 
lines suggested by Heckman (1979).  However, the IALS does not contain suitable instruments 
to credibly identify such a system.  Instead, I use a technique that is based on a method devised 
by Hunt (2002) and also implemented by Blau and Kahn (2005).   
To understand this adjustment, consider the samples of men.  Their employment-
population ratios (where the self-employed are not included in the sample) range from 0.581 in 
Finland to 0.795 in Switzerland.  To create a sample of comparably-selected men in each county, 
I first estimate logits for men’s probability of employment separately by country.  The 
explanatory variables include the age dummies, education and the low test score dummy.  For 
each country with a higher male employment to population ratio than Finland’s, among those 
who are employed, I then drop from the sample those with the lowest predicted probabilities of 
employment, leaving a sample equal to 58.1% of the population (i.e., Finland’s male 
employment-population ratio).
22  I perform a similar analysis for women, for whom IALS data 
show that Italy is the base country with the lowest female employment to population ratio among 
the non-self-employed at 0.335.  This procedure yields male and female samples with the same 
relative likelihood of employment and imposes no a priori assumptions about the market or 
nonmarket productivity of nonparticipants vs. participants.  It is similar in spirit to propensity 
score matching. 
                                                           
22  To illustrate this process, consider Switzerland, in which 79.5% of the population of men who were not self-
employed had jobs.  From the Swiss sample of men with wage and salary jobs, I eliminate the lowest 27% (i.e. 
[(0.795-0.581)/(0.795)]) of individuals with respect to their estimated probability of employment.  I perform an 
analogous adjustment for the other countries.   
  30Table 10 shows the results for my basic specification, where the sample has been 
adjusted as described above.  The results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 5.  First, more 
stringent employment protection raises the age gap in permanent employment for 36-45 and 46-
55 year olds relative to 26-35 year olds, although the interaction effects are negative for 26-35 
year olds vs. 16-25 year olds and are smaller for 56-65 year olds than for those 36-55 years old.  
Second, protection disproportionately reduces the permanent employment of those with low 
cognitive ability, with consistently negative effects that are significant two of four times.  Third, 
protection continues to disproportionately reduce the permanent employment of women, effects 
that are always highly statistically significant.  Finally, the protection effects on immigrants are 
also negative relative to natives, although the coefficients are not significant.  But overall, the 
pattern of results is very similar to those which did not correct for selection.
23
 
5.  Disaggregating the Components of the OECD Protection Index 
 
The results presented so far are based on the OECD’s index of employment protection, 
which is treated as a continuous variable.  Not only does this imply a cardinality to the index 
itself; it also necessarily imposes the OECD’s implicit weights from the components of the 
index.  That is, based on the components, the OECD decides on the overall index value.  In this 
section, I present results from basic models where the components have been disaggegated.  This 
design allows us to determine which policy (if any) is most responsible for the basic findings in 
Table 5.  Moreover, for most of the components, the key policy variable is defined as an actual 
number of years of benefit or mandatory notice entitlement, allowing for a more natural 
interpretation of a one unit change than would a variable defined as an index.  
Table A3 shows the results of this disaggregation.  Specifically, I estimate a separate 
model for each component, in light of the correlation among the components (which prevents 
                                                           
23  When I included the self-employed in the sample and repeated the correction for selection, the results were very 
similar, and the multinomial logit results in Tables 3, 4 and A2 were very similar when the self-employed were 
excluded from the sample. 
  31their simultaneous inclusion).  These include i) years of mandated severance pay for a worker 
dismissed after 20 years; ii) years of mandated compensation in the event of unfair dismissal; iii) 
years of mandatory notice required for someone laid off with 20 years’ seniority; and iv) the 
OECD’s index of procedural inconvenience for firms that wish to dismiss workers.  The Table 
shows models including country dummy variables with occupation, industry and their 
interactions with gender excluded (Panel A) or included (Panel B).  Interaction effects between 
each policy and the key demographic and skill variables are shown.  In each case the effects are 
similar to the aggregated results shown earlier.  More generous severance pay or unfair dismissal 
compensation, longer mandatory notice, and more procedural inconvenience each have positive 
interaction effects with age and negative interaction effects for those with low test scores, 
women and immigrants in models estimating the probability of having a permanent job.  While 
the statistical significance of these interaction effects varies, the overall pattern confirms the 
results based on the OECD’s overall index.  In particular, the interactions for prime age vs. 
youth, female vs. male, and immigrant vs. native are usually statistically significant. 
 
6.  Results Excluding Countries with High or Low Employment Protection Levels 
 
  Much has been written about the extensive set of employment protection regulations in 
Italy (see, for example, Nicoletti 2002).  With my relatively small sample of countries, it is 
possible that the results presented so far reflect Italy-other country differences in the 
demographic and skill patterns of permanent employment rather than the impact of employment 
protection.  I have therefore estimated the basic permanent employment logit models among 
wage and salary workers with Italy excluded, and the results are shown in Table A4.  The 
findings are quite similar to those in Table 5.  In addition, as Table 1 shows, the Netherlands also 
has a high OECD overall index rating for employment protection which is actually slightly 
higher than Italy’s.  The basic results were similar when the Netherlands was excluded and when 
both the Netherlands and Italy were excluded from the analysis.  Finally, the essential patterns 
  32remained when the United States, the country with the weakest set of employment protection 
mandates, was excluded.  These alternative analyses excluding key countries imply that the 
effects I have found in this paper are more general than merely country-specific effects. 
 
7.  Results Excluding Those Age 16-25 
 
  As noted earlier, the quality and availability of schooling opportunities can affect the 
relative incidence of temporary employment of employed young people.  For example, if one is 
planning to go to school, one may be much more willing than otherwise to take a temporary job.  
If employment protection laws are correlated with schooling opportunities, then even with 
country dummies, the positive interaction effects found above for employment protection-age 
interactions may reflect schooling opportunities.  Therefore, to take account of this possibility, I 
have re-estimated the basic models by excluding those age 16-25.  In this way, I focus on a 
group (those age 26-65) whose choice of permanent or temporary jobs is relatively unaffected by 
schooling opportunities.  Table A5 shows the results of this analysis, and they are very similar to 
those for the full sample (Table 5).  In particular, the age-employment protection effects are all 
positive and significant (relative to the omitted group, which is 26-35 year olds) and increase 
with age.  And the interaction effects of protection with low test score, female, and immigrant 
dummy variables remain negative in every case, and are significant (at the 10% level on two 
tailed tests) at least half of the time.  Thus, the basic results hold up for a sample which is largely 
beyond the school-attendance years.
24   
 
VII.  Conclusions 
 
                                                           
24  In particular, only about 1% of those age 26-65 in the IALS reported school attendance as their major activity, 
compared to 36% of 16-25 year olds. 
  33  In this paper, I have estimated the impact of employment protection legislation on the 
incidence of nonemployment and permanent employment.  I argued on theoretical grounds that 
protection should tend to lower the relative incidence of employment and of permanent jobs for 
the young, women, immigrants, and the less skilled.  I tested these predictions using 1994-98 
IALS data on Canada, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States, countries with widely varying degrees of employment protection.  I indeed found 
that greater protection disproportionately lowered the probability that youths, women, and 
immigrants were employed; in addition, among those with jobs, I generally found that greater 
employment protection also lowered the relative incidence of permanent work among these 
groups, as well as those with low cognitive ability.  Upon closer examination, the negative 
immigrant effects on permanent employment were concentrated on women.  Moreover, greater 
coverage by collective bargaining, with its wage floors, accentuated the effects of employment 
protection in reducing the incidence of employment for young people and the less skilled; and 
among the employed, collective bargaining accentuated the negative effects of EPL on the 
incidence of permanent jobs for the young, those with low cognitive ability, women and 
immigrants.   
  My findings are complementary with earlier research which finds that the high wage 
floors associated with high levels of centralized collective bargaining lead to lower relative 
employment or higher relative unemployment of young people and women (Kahn 2000; Bertola, 
Blau and Kahn 2002).  Institutions such as collective bargaining and systems of employment 
protection together have the effect of protecting the permanent jobs of prime age men, at the 
expense of a possibly large set of outsiders who spend considerable time out of work or shifting 
among temporary jobs. 
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Appendix:  IALS Test Scores and the Definition of Low Test Scores (termed “Level 1”) 
 
  The IALS gave each respondents tests to measure three kinds of literacy: 
 
  “a) Prose literacy—the knowledge and skills needed to understand and use information from texts 
including editorials, news stories, poems and fiction; 
 b) Document literacy—the knowledge and skills required to locate and use information 
contained in various formats, including job applications, payroll forms, transportation schedules, maps, 
tables, and graphics; and 
 c) Quantitative literacy—the knowledge and skills required to apply arithmetic operations, either 
alone or sequentially, to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a checkbook, 
calculating a tip, completing an order form, or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an 
advertisement” (IALS Guide CD-ROM, page 9). 
 
Proficiency in each of the three test areas was scored on a scale of 0-500, after the tests were read 
by several graders from the respondent's own country.  The IALS provides five alternative estimates of 
proficiency for each test, which were computed from the raw test performance information using a 
multiple imputation procedure developed by Rubin (1987).  These alternative estimates are in fact highly 
correlated.  Within each of the three types of test, the five estimates of the score were correlated at 
roughly .9.  Further, to ensure comparability of grading across countries, an average of 9.4% of the tests 
for each country were regraded by personnel from another country; inter-rater agreement with respect to 
these regrades was 94-99%.   
 
The IALS distinguished five literacy levels based on where one’s continuous score fell:  Level 1 
(0-225); Level 2 (226-275); Level 3 (276-325); Level 4 (326-375); and Level 5 (376-500).  In Figure 4, 
low test scores are defined as Level 1.  For example, on the Prose Literacy test, Level 1 questions require 
“the reader to locate one piece of information in the text that is identical to or synonymous with the 
information given in the directive” (IALS Guide CD, page 19).  An example, given by the IALS, is to 
determine from an aspirin bottle label the maximum number of days one should use the product.  For 
higher levels of Prose Literacy, respondents are required to read and interpret more and more dense 
selections of text and to integrate several pieces of information.  On the Document Literacy Test, 
respondents at Level 1 must “locate a single piece of information based on a literal match” (IALS Guide 
CD, page 24).  Higher Levels of Document Literacy require one to wade through distracting information 
and to integrate several pieces of information or to make conditional inferences.  Finally, the Level 1 
Quantitative Literacy questions require the reader to perform a simple calculation that is clearly laid out.  
Higher Levels of Quantitative Literacy require one to find information given in an example and to know 
which calculations to make.  Comparing those with low cognitive ability with others is a particularly 
relevant exercise here.  This is the case, since wage floors (and therefore constraints on firms’ ability to 
compensate for high firing costs by lowering wages) are most likely to be binding for those with low 
ability (as well as other low wage workers such as youth, immigrants and women). 
  
Figure 1:  Incidence of Permanent Employment by Strength of Permanent Employment 
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Figure 2:  Incidence of Permanent Employment by Strength of Permanent Employment 
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 Table 1:  Employment Protection Mandates for Regular Employment, Late 1990s
Months of Severance Pay for No-


















(0 to 6 scale)
9 Months 4 Years 20 Years
Canada 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.9
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.0 6.0 2.8 2.1
Italy 0.7 3.5 18.0 32.5 2.2 1.5 2.8
Netherlands 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 3.0 5.0 3.1
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.0 3.0 0.5 1.2
UK 0.0 0.5 2.4 8.0 2.8 1.0 0.8
USA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
Source:  OECD (1999), pp. 55 and 66.  
 
  




















(0 to 6 scale)
Canada No limit No limit 4.0 0.3
Finland 1.5 No limit 4.0 1.9
Italy 2.0 15.0 1.0 3.8
Netherlands 3.0 No limit 3.5 1.2
Switzerland 1.5 No limit 4.0 0.9
UK No limit No limit 4.0 0.3
USA No limit No limit 4.0 0.3
Source:  OECD (1999), pp. 62 and 66.  
 Table 3: Selected Multinomial Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on 
Nonemployment, Temporary Employment and Permanent Employment (sample includes all adults)
A.  Probability of Permanent 
Employment vs. Nonemployment 
(multinomial logit coeffs) coef ase
relative 
risk ratio coef ase
relative 
risk ratio
EPL Index -0.159 0.232 0.853 --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 0.319 0.203 1.376 0.309 0.199 1.362
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.366 0.250 1.441 0.360 0.247 1.433
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.257 0.263 1.293 0.253 0.262 1.287
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.046 0.236 1.047 0.052 0.233 1.053
EPL Index*Education -0.019 0.012 0.981 -0.019 0.010 0.982
EPL Index*Low Test Score 0.047 0.053 1.048 0.059 0.050 1.061
EPL Index*Female -0.149 0.090 0.862 -0.140 0.091 0.870
EPL Index*Immigrant -0.300 0.077 0.741 -0.336 0.060 0.714
Country dummies? no yes
Sample size 26159 26159
B.  Probability of Permanent 
Employment vs. Temporary Employment 
(multinomial logit coeffs) coef asy se
relative 
risk ratio coef asy se
relative 
risk ratio
EPL Index -0.231 0.269 0.794 --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 0.046 0.091 1.048 0.028 0.100 1.028
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.282 0.190 1.325 0.296 0.207 1.345
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.373 0.135 1.453 0.405 0.145 1.499
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.719 0.231 2.053 0.825 0.246 2.282
EPL Index*Education -0.004 0.019 0.996 -0.001 0.019 0.999
EPL Index*Low Test Score -0.201 0.097 0.818 -0.200 0.105 0.819
EPL Index*Female -0.159 0.043 0.853 -0.150 0.048 0.861
EPL Index*Immigrant -0.225 0.125 0.798 -0.258 0.149 0.773
Country dummies? no yes
Sample size 26159 26159  
 
  
Table 3 (ctd): Selected Multinomial Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on 
Nonemployment, Temporary Employment and Permanent Employment (sample includes all adults)
C. Derivative of Prob of Nonemployment (at 
mean frequencies of employment outcomes) coef ase coef ase
EPL Index 0.031 0.050 --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 -0.072 0.046 -0.070 0.046
EPL Index*Age 36-45 -0.077 0.057 -0.076 0.057



























L Index*Age 56-65 0.007 0.054 0.008 0.054
L Index*Education 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002
L Index*Low Test Score -0.016 0.011 -0.019 0.010
L Index*Female 0.030 0.020 0.029 0.020
L Index*Immigrant 0.064 0.018 0.071 0.015
y dummies? no yes
le size 26159 26159
ative of Prob of Permanent 
ment (at mean frequencies of 
ment outcomes) coef ase coef ase
-0.042 0.055 --- ---
L Index*Age 26-35 0.068 0.043 0.065 0.042
L Index*Age 36-45 0.086 0.052 0.086 0.052
L Index*Age 46-55 0.067 0.056 0.068 0.055
L Index*Age 56-65 0.037 0.050 0.042 0.049
L Index*Education -0.004 0.003 -0.004 0.002
L Index*Low Test Score 0.002 0.013 0.005 0.013
L Index*Female -0.037 0.019 -0.035 0.020
L Index*Immigrant -0.071 0.017 -0.079 0.013
y dummies? no yes
le size 26159 26159
L Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs.  Controls include age
es, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female interactions with
 these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within countries.  Data are weighted
g IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  Relative risk ratio equals
ultinomial logit coefficient).
 
 Table 4: Selected Multinomial Logit Results for the Interaction Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) and 
Collective Bargaining coverage (CB Cov) on Nonemployment, Temporary Employment and Permanent Employment 
(sample includes all adults)
A. Derivative of Prob of Nonemployment (at mean 
frequencies of employment outcomes) effect ase effect ase
EPL Index*Age 26-35*CB Cov -0.231 0.143 -0.234 0.142
EPL Index*Age 36-45*CB Cov -0.243 0.102 -0.234 0.106
EPL Index*Age 46-55*CB Cov -0.235 0.119 -0.242 0.117
EPL Index*Age 56-65*CB Cov -0.025 0.145 -0.045 0.150
EPL Index*Education*CB Cov -0.042 0.024 -0.036 0.023
EPL Index*Low Test Score*CB Cov 0.085 0.062 0.136 0.071
EPL Index*Female*CB Cov -0.055 0.102 -0.053 0.105
EPL Index*Immigrant*CB Cov -0.043 0.092 -0.014 0.060
Country dummies? no yes
Sample size 26159 26159
B. Derivative of Prob of Permanent Employment (at 
mean frequencies of employment outcomes) effect ase effect ase
EPL Index*Age 26-35*CB Cov 0.290 0.128 0.307 0.125
EPL Index*Age 36-45*CB Cov 0.421 0.095 0.428 0.096
EPL Index*Age 46-55*CB Cov 0.346 0.112 0.362 0.108
EPL Index*Age 56-65*CB Cov 0.168 0.138 0.194 0.138
EPL Index*Education*CB Cov 0.044 0.021 0.038 0.020
EPL Index*Low Test Score*CB Cov 0.028 0.055 -0.029 0.064
EPL Index*Female*CB Cov 0.002 0.093 -0.007 0.094
EPL Index*Immigrant*CB Cov -0.040 0.084 -0.067 0.059
Country dummies? no yes
Sample size 26159 26159
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection for regular jobs, and CB Cov is collective
bargaining coverage.  Entries are partial derivatives of unconditional probabilities based on multinomial logit models
with nonemployment, temporary employment and permanent employment as possible outcomes.  Controls include
age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female interactions with
each of these variables, and interactions between cb and each of these controls; in addition, EPL interactions
with age dummies, education, low test score, female and immigrant are included.  In models excluding country
dummies, EPL, CB Cov and EPL*CB Cov are included.  Asymptotic standard errors are corrected for correlation















ted Regression Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on Permanent Emp
(sample includes only employed wage and salary workers)
 Least Squares coef se coef se coef se coef
-0.045 0.030 -0.039 0.027 --- --- ---
26-35 0.031 0.009 0.030 0.008 0.035 0.010 0.033
36-45 0.058 0.017 0.058 0.017 0.063 0.018 0.063
46-55 0.067 0.017 0.067 0.017 0.074 0.019 0.074
56-65 0.080 0.021 0.079 0.021 0.087 0.023 0.086
-0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
 Test Score -0.029 0.011 -0.026 0.012 -0.024 0.014 -0.022
emale -0.020 0.008 -0.019 0.007 -0.016 0.007 -0.016




B.  Logit (pa
mean of depe asy se
EPL Index ---
EPL Index*Age  0.008
EPL Index*Age  0.016
EPL Index*Age  0.011













no yes no yes
emale interactions? no yes no yes
mies? no no yes yes
13736 13736 13736 13736
rtial derivatives at 
ndent variable) coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se coef
-0.019 0.031 -0.014 0.026 --- --- ---
26-35 -0.002 0.008 -0.003 0.007 0.001 0.009 0.000
36-45 0.021 0.015 0.023 0.013 0.029 0.017 0.032
46-55 0.029 0.011 0.033 0.011 0.040 0.012 0.043
56-65 0.057 0.024 0.061 0.022 0.074 0.027 0.078
-0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
 Test Score -0.020 0.012 -0.020 0.013 -0.016 0.014 -0.017
emale -0.013 0.003 -0.012 0.001 -0.011 0.002 -0.010
migrant -0.015 0.010 -0.016 0.010 -0.022 0.012 -0.022
no yes no yes
emale interactions? no yes no yes
mies? no no yes yes
13736 13736 13736 13736
 the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs.
 age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female
ith each of these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within countries.  Data ar












0.009Table 6:  Effect of Employment Protection on US-Netherlands Differences in Age, Gender, Immigrant Status, and Cognitive Ability-Based 
Gaps in Permanent Employment Incidence (among wage and salary workers)
Dimension Netherlands US Difference:  Netherlands-US
Effect Asy std err
1.  Age
46-55 Permanent Employment Incidence 0.957 0.962 -0.006 ----
16-25 Permanent Employment Incidence 0.676 0.811 -0.135 ----
Actual Permanent Employment Gap (46-55 minus 16-25) 0.281 0.152 0.129 ----
Effect of Changing from US to Dutch Protection ---- ---- 0.126 0.032
Percentage of US-Dutch Difference Explained by Protection ---- ---- 97.5% 25.2%
2.  Gender
Male Permanent Employment Incidence 0.899 0.944 -0.045 ----
Female Permanent Employment Incidence 0.844 0.930 -0.085 ----
Actual Permanent Employment Gap (Male minus Female) 0.055 0.014 0.041 ----
Effect of Changing from US to Dutch Protection ---- ---- 0.029 0.003
Percentage of US-Dutch Difference Explained by Protection ---- ---- 71.0% 7.7%
3. Cognitive Ability
Permanent Employment Incidence for Higher Than Level 1 Test Score 0.879 0.935 -0.056 ----
Permanent Employment Incidence for Low Test Score (Level 1) 0.855 0.950 -0.095 ----
Actual Permanent Employment Gap (Above Level 1 minus Level 1) 0.024 -0.015 0.040 ----
Effect of Changing from US to Dutch Protection ---- ---- 0.050 0.043
Percentage of US-Dutch Difference Explained by Protection ---- ---- 126.2% 109.9%
4.  Nativity
Native Permanent Employment Incidence 0.881 0.936 -0.055 ----
Immigrant Permanent Employment Incidence 0.821 0.940 -0.119 ----
Actual Permanent Employment Gap (Native minus Immigrant) 0.060 -0.003 0.064 ----
Effect of Changing from US to Dutch Protection ---- ---- 0.064 0.032
Percentage of US-Dutch Difference Explained by Protection ---- ---- 100.8% 50.3%












elected Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on Permanent Employm
ive Bargaining Coverage (CB Cov) Interactions, Wage and Salary Workers (partial derivatives at me
dependent variable)
coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se coef
26-35 -0.096 0.018 -0.084 0.016 -0.108 0.011 -0.095
36-45 -0.202 0.022 -0.193 0.020 -0.209 0.015 -0.199
46-55 -0.097 0.024 -0.088 0.023 -0.103 0.018 -0.092
56-65 -0.080 0.064 -0.067 0.059 -0.091 0.057 -0.075
























EPL Index is overed
by collectiv emale
as well as f
EPL*CB Cov ar
Data are w
 Test Score -0.108 0.025 -0.102 0.019 -0.101 0.024 -0.098
emale 0.037 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.041 0.008 0.012
migrant 0.137 0.049 0.133 0.049 0.148 0.070 0.139
ge 26-35 -0.058 0.037 -0.060 0.032 -0.082 0.027 -0.086
ge 36-45 -0.134 0.047 -0.105 0.037 -0.169 0.030 -0.144
ge 46-55 -0.168 0.044 -0.149 0.047 -0.195 0.046 -0.180
ge 56-65 -0.467 0.151 -0.432 0.173 -0.506 0.115 -0.462
ducation -0.060 0.008 -0.056 0.007 -0.057 0.007 -0.053
w Test Score -0.338 0.049 -0.337 0.052 -0.363 0.046 -0.356
ale -0.021 0.010 -0.043 0.032 -0.010 0.021 -0.032
migrant -0.137 0.130 -0.109 0.128 -0.171 0.157 -0.140
PL Index*Age 26-35 0.115 0.015 0.102 0.011 0.135 0.009 0.121
PL Index*Age 36-45 0.273 0.031 0.259 0.029 0.290 0.021 0.276
PL Index*Age 46-55 0.185 0.030 0.173 0.028 0.200 0.023 0.187
PL Index*Age 56-65 0.302 0.060 0.285 0.063 0.326 0.063 0.302
PL Index*Education 0.019 0.005 0.016 0.005 0.017 0.005 0.014
PL Index*Low Test Score 0.166 0.025 0.161 0.021 0.172 0.028 0.168
PL Index*Female -0.046 0.008 -0.008 0.014 -0.051 0.010 -0.015
PL Index*Immigrant -0.128 0.048 -0.131 0.041 -0.137 0.064 -0.135
 ? no yes no yes
* female interactions? no yes no yes
mmies? no no yes yes
e 13736 13736 13736 1373
 the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs.  CB Cov is fraction c
e bargaining.  Controls include age dummies, education, and dummies for low test score, immigrant, and f
emale interactions with each of these variables.  In models excluding country dummies, EPL, CB Cov and
e included.  (Asymptotic) standard errors are corrected for correlation within countries.










0.003Table 8: Selected Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on Permanent Employment, with 
Female Interactions, Wage and Salary Workers (partial derivatives at mean of dependent variable)
coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se
EPL Index -0.013 0.023 -0.005 0.014 --- --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.006
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.026 0.022 0.031 0.020 0.033 0.025 0.038 0.022
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.040 0.013 0.045 0.011 0.048 0.014 0.053 0.011
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.068 0.022 0.066 0.022 0.080 0.024 0.077 0.024
EPL Index*Education -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001
EPL Index*Low Test Score -0.028 0.008 -0.028 0.010 -0.022 0.007 -0.023 0.009
EPL Index*Female -0.024 0.052 -0.031 0.049 -0.028 0.056 -0.033 0.052
EPL Index*Immigrant 0.014 0.007 0.016 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.008
Female*EPL Index*Age 26-35 -0.011 0.019 -0.007 0.018 -0.008 0.021 -0.004 0.020
Female*EPL Index*Age 36-45 -0.010 0.024 -0.013 0.024 -0.007 0.028 -0.011 0.027
Female*EPL Index*Age 46-55 -0.019 0.025 -0.022 0.023 -0.013 0.029 -0.018 0.026
Female*EPL Index*Age 56-65 -0.019 0.032 -0.008 0.035 -0.010 0.040 0.002 0.043
Female*EPL Index*Education 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
Female*EPL Index*Low Test Score 0.014 0.032 0.014 0.037 0.011 0.034 0.011 0.039
Female*EPL Index*Immigrant -0.061 0.026 -0.067 0.029 -0.064 0.028 -0.069 0.031
occup, ind ? no yes no yes
(occup,ind)* female interactions? no yes no yes
Country dummies? no no yes yes
Sample size 13736 13736 13736 13736
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs. 
Controls include age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy, and a female
dummy and female interactions with each of these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within
countries.  Data are weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  
 
 Table 9: Selected Logit Results for the Effects of Regular (EPL Index) and Temporary Employment Protection (Temp 
Index) on Permanent Employment, Wage and Salary Workers (partial derivatives at mean of dependent variable)
coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se
EPL Index 0.003 0.030 0.005 0.028 --- --- --- ---
Temp Index -0.021 0.021 -0.018 0.019 --- --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.008
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.018 0.025 0.019 0.024 0.017
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.014 0.028 0.012 0.027 0.011
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.019 0.041 0.026 0.038 0.035 0.044 0.042 0.040
EPL Index*Education -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002
EPL Index*Low Test Score -0.025 0.022 -0.027 0.022 -0.021 0.025 -0.024 0.024
EPL Index*Female -0.009 0.002 -0.011 0.002 -0.008 0.002 -0.009 0.002
EPL Index*Immigrant -0.019 0.008 -0.020 0.010 -0.016 0.009 -0.017 0.010
Temp Index*Age 26-35 -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.006 -0.006 0.005 -0.006 0.006
Temp Index*Age 36-45 0.005 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.004 0.014 0.009 0.013
Temp Index*Age 46-55 0.013 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.017 0.007
Temp Index*Age 56-65 0.050 0.035 0.048 0.036 0.044 0.033 0.042 0.034
Temp Index*Education 0.0002 0.002 -0.0003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.0003 0.002
Temp Index*Low Test Score 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.014
Temp Index*Female -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.003 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.004
Temp Index*Immigrant 0.001 0.013 0.002 0.015 -0.008 0.017 -0.007 0.018
occup, ind ? no yes no yes
(occup,ind)* female interactions? no yes no yes
Country dummies? no no yes yes
Sample size 13736 13736 13736 13736
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs. 
Temp Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for temporary jobs. 
Controls include age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy, and a female
dummy and female interactions with each of these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within
countries.  Data are weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  
 
 Table 10: Selected Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on Permanent Employment with 
Adjustment for Selection into Employment, Wage and Salary Workers (partial derivatives at mean of dependent variable)
coef se coef se coef se coef se
EPL Index -0.015 0.028 -0.015 0.028 --- --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 -0.011 0.005 -0.011 0.005 -0.007 0.006 -0.006 0.007
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.010 0.006 0.010 0.006 0.020 0.004 0.025 0.004
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.020 0.005 0.020 0.005 0.031 0.009 0.037 0.008
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.005 0.032 0.005 0.032 0.020 0.030 0.011 0.030
EPL Index*Education -0.0002 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.0003 0.002 -0.001 0.002
EPL Index*Low Test Score -0.017 0.008 -0.017 0.008 -0.009 0.009 -0.009 0.009
EPL Index*Female -0.013 0.003 -0.013 0.003 -0.012 0.002 -0.012 0.004
EPL Index*Immigrant -0.006 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.009 0.009 -0.008 0.009
occup, ind ? no yes no yes
(occup,ind)* female interactions? no yes no yes
Country dummies? no no yes yes
Sample size 11395 11395 11395 11395
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs.
Controls include age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female
interactions with each of these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within countries.  Data are
weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  For description of
selectivity adjustment, see text.  
 
 Table A1:  Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables, by Country
Sample Includes All Adults (IALS)
Sample Includes Only 
Employed Wage and Salary 
Workers













Canada 0.277 0.071 0.652 0.100 0.118
Finland 0.362 0.066 0.572 0.123 0.145
Italy 0.322 0.071 0.607 0.129 0.088
Netherlands 0.280 0.067 0.653 0.101 0.115
Switzerland 0.184 0.054 0.762 0.064 0.105
UK 0.264 0.072 0.664 0.092 0.059
USA 0.190 0.040 0.769 0.056 0.039
B.  Women
Canada 0.445 0.072 0.483 0.127 0.133
Finland 0.404 0.113 0.484 0.205 0.209
Italy 0.603 0.077 0.320 0.215 0.122
Netherlands 0.549 0.069 0.382 0.156 0.172
Switzerland 0.405 0.042 0.553 0.076 0.128
UK 0.386 0.075 0.539 0.122 0.077
USA 0.336 0.050 0.614 0.070 0.042
Sources:  IALS and OECD (2002, p. 138).  IALS data are weighted using IALS sampling weights
adjusted so that each country receives the same total weight.  
 
  
Table A2: Selected Multinomial Logit Results for the Interaction Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) and 
 
Collective Bargaining coverage (CB Cov)on Nonemployment, Temporary Employment and Permanent Employment (sample 
includes all adults)
A.  Probability of Permanent 
Employment vs. Nonemployment 





EPL Index*Age 26-35*CB Cov 1.149 0.620 3.154 1.188 0.603 3.279
EPL Index*Age 36-45*CB Cov 1.411 0.458 4.099 1.397 0.463 4.041
EPL Index*Age 46-55*CB Cov 1.259 0.538 3.521 1.307 0.522 3.694
EPL Index*Age 56-65*CB Cov 0.362 0.666 1.436 0.465 0.664 1.592
EPL Index*Education*CB Cov 0.194 0.103 1.214 0.168 0.095 1.182
EPL Index*Low Test Score*CB Cov -0.187 0.259 0.830 -0.430 0.305 0.651
EPL Index*Female*CB Cov 0.156 0.448 1.168 0.135 0.456 1.145
EPL Index*Immigrant*CB Cov 0.051 0.399 1.052 -0.080 0.256 0.924
Country dummies? no yes
Sample size 26159 26159
B.  Probability of Permanent 
Employment vs. Temporary 
Employment (multinomial logit 
coeffs) coef asy se
relative risk 
ratio coef asy se
relative risk 
ratio
EPL Index*Age 26-35*CB Cov 1.391 0.185 4.018 1.613 0.217 5.019
EPL Index*Age 36-45*CB Cov 3.370 0.318 29.070 3.628 0.186 37.649
EPL Index*Age 46-55*CB Cov 2.254 0.283 9.521 2.411 0.200 11.147
EPL Index*Age 56-65*CB Cov 2.426 0.407 11.310 2.555 0.451 12.876
EPL Index*Education*CB Cov 0.116 0.054 1.123 0.087 0.047 1.091
EPL Index*Low Test Score*CB Cov 1.720 0.343 5.583 1.530 0.291 4.620
EPL Index*Female*CB Cov -0.788 0.136 0.455 -0.896 0.117 0.408
EPL Index*Immigrant*CB Cov -1.306 0.508 0.271 -1.323 0.684 0.266
Country dummies? no yes
Sample size 26159 26159
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs, and CB Cov is collective
bargaining coverage.  Relative risk ratio equals exp(multinomial logit coefficient).  Controls include
age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female interactions
with each of these variables, and interactions between CB Cov and each of these controls; in addition, in models excluding
country dummies, EPL, CB Cov and EPL*CB Cov are included.  Asymptotic standard errors are corrected for correlation within
countries.  Data are weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  
 Table A3: Selected Logit Results for Demographic or Skill Interactions with Individual Components of the Permanent Protection Index Permanent 
Employment, Wage and Salary Workers (partial derivatives at mean of dep var)
Interactions of Individual Protection Component Individual Protection Component Variable
Variable and the Indicated Personal Characteristic






coef ase coef ase coef ase coef ase
A.  Occup, Industry, and their interactions with female 
excluded
Age26-35 -0.020 0.010 -0.002 0.009 0.049 0.067 0.005 0.003
Age36-45 -0.005 0.024 0.025 0.020 0.185 0.107 0.022 0.009
Age 46-55 0.030 0.022 0.038 0.009 0.115 0.055 0.020 0.005
Age 56-65 0.054 0.049 0.071 0.023 0.205 0.129 0.041 0.010
Education 0.003 0.002 -0.00004 0.002 -0.033 0.004 -0.001 0.001
Low Test Score -0.001 0.015 -0.010 0.014 -0.197 0.092 -0.008 0.010
Female -0.008 0.006 -0.011 0.003 -0.068 0.015 -0.007 0.002
Immigrant -0.023 0.022 -0.041 0.022 -0.271 0.105 -0.018 0.008
B.  Occup, Industry, and their interactions with female 
included
Age26-35 -0.017 0.009 -0.002 0.007 0.033 0.055 0.005 0.003
Age36-45 0.003 0.023 0.029 0.017 0.193 0.100 0.023 0.010
Age 46-55 0.040 0.022 0.044 0.007 0.119 0.051 0.021 0.006
Age 56-65 0.048 0.047 0.072 0.022 0.224 0.115 0.043 0.009
Education 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.032 0.003 -0.001 0.001
Low Test Score -0.002 0.017 -0.012 0.015 -0.199 0.096 -0.009 0.010
Female -0.005 0.009 -0.008 0.004 -0.053 0.017 -0.005 0.001
Immigrant -0.023 0.021 -0.041 0.021 -0.245 0.107 -0.018 0.008
Sample size 13736 13736 13736 13736
Entries based on a separate regression for each component indicator.  Severance Pay and Unfair Dismissal pay refer to years of salary
entitlement for a worker with 20 years of seniority.  Mandatory Notice refers to years of notice required for someone with 20 years of
seniority.  Procedural Inconvenience Index is the OECD's index of procedural inconvenience, which has a range of 1-6.
Controls include age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy, female interactions with each
of these variables (except the female dummy), and country dummies.  Asymptotic standard errors corrected for correlation within countries.
Data are weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight. 
 
 
 Table A4: Selected Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on Permanent Employment, Italy 
Excluded, Wage and Salary Workers (derivatives at mean of dependent variable)
coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se
EPL Index -0.0020 0.0026 -0.0018 0.0025 --- --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 26-35 0.0031 0.0009 0.0029 0.0007 0.0034 0.0011 0.0032 0.0009
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.0050 0.0017 0.0050 0.0017 0.0056 0.0020 0.0056 0.0020
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.0052 0.0013 0.0052 0.0012 0.0061 0.0018 0.0060 0.0018
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.0063 0.0018 0.0064 0.0019 0.0071 0.0022 0.0071 0.0023
EPL Index*Education -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002
EPL Index*Low Test Score -0.0026 0.0018 -0.0024 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0019 -0.0024 0.0018
EPL Index*Female -0.0018 0.0010 -0.0017 0.0009 -0.0014 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0006
EPL Index*Immigrant -0.0017 0.0010 -0.0018 0.0011 -0.0023 0.0010 -0.0024 0.0010
occup, ind ? no yes no yes
(occup,ind)* female interactions? no yes no yes
Country dummies? no no yes yes
Sample size 12446 12446 12446 12446
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs.
Controls include age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female
interactions with each of these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within countries.  Data are
weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  
 
 Table A5: Selected Logit Results for the Effects of Employment Protection (EPL Index) on Permanent Employment, 
Excluding Those Age 16-25, Wage and Salary Workers (derivatives at mean of dependent variable)
coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se coef asy se
EPL Index -0.0101 0.0250 -0.0092 0.0207 --- --- --- ---
EPL Index*Age 36-45 0.0183 0.0066 0.0209 0.0064 0.0235 0.0072 0.0260 0.0070
EPL Index*Age 46-55 0.0247 0.0085 0.0286 0.0096 0.0321 0.0073 0.0362 0.0087
EPL Index*Age 56-65 0.0471 0.0158 0.0520 0.0144 0.0638 0.0153 0.0676 0.0140
EPL Index*Education -0.0009 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0013 -0.0007 0.0016 -0.0009 0.0014
EPL Index*Low Test Score -0.0179 0.0079 -0.0169 0.0081 -0.0133 0.0095 -0.0134 0.0096
EPL Index*Female -0.0129 0.0036 -0.0111 0.0047 -0.0105 0.0039 -0.0082 0.0054
EPL Index*Immigrant -0.0074 0.0056 -0.0106 0.0062 -0.0125 0.0087 -0.0157 0.0089
occup, ind ? no yes no yes
(occup,ind)* female interactions? no yes no yes
Country dummies? no no yes yes
Sample size 11614 11614 11614 11614
EPL Index is the OECD's index of strength of employment protection mandates for regular jobs.
Controls include age dummies, education, low test score dummy, immigrant dummy and a female dummy and female
interactions with each of these variables.  (Asymptotic) standard errors corrected for correlation within countries.  Data are
weighted using IALS sampling weights adjusted so that each country gets the same total weight.  
 
 